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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 
19901 are well aware that judicial interpretation of Title I2 of the 
ADA has been fraught with enormous difficulties for plaintiffs with 
disabilities. Under Title I, employees with disabilities are entitled to a 
variety of reasonable accommodations such as making facilities 
readily accessible, job restructuring, or modifying work schedules.3 
An individual has a disability under the ADA if he or she has a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law (Common Law Section), University of 
Ottawa; S.J.D. Candidate, University of Toronto Faculty of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 
2002; LL.B., University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, 1998. I would like to thank Sam Bagenstos, 
my former supervisor and mentor at Harvard Law School, for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium. I also extend thanks to Michael Lynk, Erica See, Kamil Ahmed, Lauren Attard, the 
editors of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for their insightful comments, 
and a special thank you to my research assistant, Katharine Neufeld.  
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
 2. Title I prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability by employers 
with fifteen or more employees. Id. §§ 12111–12117. 
 3. Id. § 12111(9). 
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that individual's major life activities, a record of such an impairment, 
or is regarded as having such an impairment.4 As legal scholar Ruth 
Colker has documented, defendants have won the vast majority of 
employment discrimination cases under the ADA.5 Indeed, a virtual 
cottage industry has sprung up in the law reviews devoted to 
evaluating alternative explanations for the persistence of courts to 
rule against disabled plaintiffs in what many scholars regard as a 
judicial backlash against the ADA.6 Samuel Bagenstos has 
persuasively argued that disability rights advocates lobbying for the 
passage of the ADA themselves articulated a conservative philosophy 
that stressed how the ADA could be seen as a measure that would 
keep people with disabilities off of the welfare rolls.7  
 
 4. Id. § 12102(2). 
 5. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 99, 99–100 (1999) (noting analysis of cases showing defendants 
winning more than 93% of reported cases at the trial level); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 248 (2001) (showing that, 
according to studies, appeals by defendant employers were far more likely to be successful than 
appeals by plaintiffs); see also Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil 
Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 20 (2000) (noting that the ABA Commission 
on Physical and Mental Disability Law reached the same conclusions). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 529–33 (1997) (arguing that reasonable accommodation 
should not be misunderstood as special treatment); Diller, supra note 5, at 40 (suggesting the 
existence of backlash against conceptions of equality that require differential treatment); Arlene 
B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded as” Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional 
Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 609–10 (1997) (suggesting that courts have wrongly required 
plaintiffs to demonstrate the inability to work at jobs other than the job at issue in the 
litigation); Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335 (2000) (exposing the capitalist opposition to the ADA); 
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights 
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (2001) (suggesting the inherent conflict between the civil rights 
paradigm and the duty to provide accommodation); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme 
Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 
321, 349 (2000) [hereinafter Tucker, Supreme] (arguing that the Supreme Court’s rule requiring 
plaintiffs to undertake mitigating measures is “more concerned with requiring people with 
disabilities to pull themselves up by their bootstraps” than recognizing civil rights). But see 
Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1223–26 
(2003) (arguing that the definition of disability in the ADA is unclear). 
 7. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 927 (2003) (observing that “the ADA was sold to a significant 
extent as a means of welfare reform”). 
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In this Article, I seek to provide a different perspective on this 
dilemma by analyzing the origins of the duty to accommodate people 
with disabilities in Canadian law in order to present a counter-factual 
argument on why the duty to accommodate has not flourished in 
American law. Comparative legal approaches have the merit of 
shedding fresh light on old legal problems that might not otherwise 
be considered.8  
The duty to accommodate workers with disabilities in Canadian 
law has its origins in the duty to accommodate religious minorities in 
the workplace9 as well as, ironically, the American legal theory of the 
disparate impact of discrimination.10 As this principle of 
accommodation gradually began to be applied in numerous cases 
involving workers with disabilities, Canadian judges, human rights 
adjudicators, and labor arbitrators were readily able to grasp the 
concept of reasonable accommodations and to intelligently apply it to 
a variety of disability discrimination cases. These cases included 
disputes over seniority systems, pregnancy and maternity leave, and 
termination.11 While the Canadian interpretation of the duty to 
accommodate workers with disabilities is far from perfect, it is 
evident that Canadian courts are far more generous to disabled 
workers than their American counterparts in the field of 
employment.12  
 
 8. See, e.g., Stanley S. Herr, Reforming Disability Nondiscrimination Laws: A 
Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305 (2001) (comparing disability rights 
legislation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel); Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine 
W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Discrimination: American Oddity or Internationally Accepted 
Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 108, 111 (1998) (analyzing the reception of 
disparate impact doctrine outside the United States and commenting, “The international 
marketplace of legal ideas provides a means of testing the value of a concept . . . .”). 
 9. See, e.g., Colleen Sheppard, Of Forest Fires and Systemic Discrimination: A Review 
of British Columbia (Public Services Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., 46 
MCGILL L.J. 533, 544 (2001) (“[The Canadian] paradigm for thinking about adverse effect 
discrimination is religion and employment.”). 
 10. Hunter & Shoben, supra note 8, at 119–20.  
 11. Michael Lynk, A Hardy Transplant: The Duty to Accommodate and Disability Rights 
in Canadian Labour Law, 49 LAB. L.J. 962, 965 (1998) [hereinafter Lynk, Hardy] (describing 
the development of the duty to accommodate); Michael Lynk, Disability and the Duty to 
Accommodate: An Arbitrator’s Perspective, in 1 LAB. ARB. Y.B. 51, 58–61 (Kevin Whitaker et 
al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Lynk, Disability] (describing the wide scope of the duty to 
accommodate in Canadian law). 
 12. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. I subsume both Canadian human rights 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In contrast, American jurisprudence on the duty to accommodate 
religious minorities in the workplace has had a completely different 
and rather truncated history.13 This no doubt reflects, in part, the 
complex historical legacy of the First Amendment and the potentially 
contradictory effects of the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses.14 Consequently, American jurists have been deprived of the 
opportunities for the intellectual cross-fertilization that permitted 
Canadian courts to develop a robust concept of reasonable 
accommodation in the field of disability discrimination. The duty to 
accommodate drafted into the ADA by Congress was closely 
associated in the minds of judges and the bar with the abridged and 
aberrant Title VII duty to accommodate workers with religious 
beliefs.15 Despite congressional intent expressed in the statutory 
language to mandate significant changes in American workplaces and 
specific statements by Congress that the duty to accommodate under 
the ADA ought not to be interpreted in the same fashion as the 
narrow Title VII duty to accommodate, the duty to accommodate 
workers with disabilities emerged after the passage of the ADA as an 
anomaly, puzzling and unfamiliar to American judges.16  
The intent of this exercise in tracing the legal genealogy of the 
concept of the duty to accommodate is not to advocate direct 
transplantation of Canadian jurisprudence into American disability 
rights law, especially because a crucial basis for the Canadian 
developments was transplantation of the American doctrine in the 
first place.17 Moreover, Canadian disability rights advocates would 
readily attest to the myriad of physical and attitudinal barriers that 
remain in Canadian society. Rather, exploring the contours of the 
Canadian path to social justice and equality for people with 
disabilities provides a clearer understanding of why there has been 
 
adjudicators and labor arbitrators under the term “courts” because of their significant role in 
adjudicating disability discrimination cases in Canada. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 15. S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability 
Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 627 (2001). 
 16. Id. at 628. 
 17. Lynk, Hardy, supra note 11, at 963 (noting how the Supreme Court of Canada 
specifically adopted American jurisprudence). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/2
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such significant resistance to accepting reasonable accommodation 
requirements in American jurisprudence.18 Also, by demonstrating 
how the notion of disability accommodation is unexceptionally 
regarded in a foreign but geographically proximate jurisdiction with a 
common law heritage and shared history, this exploration aims to 
resist the interpretations that regard the ADA as a statute that simply 
redistributes resources.19  
In Part I, I trace the history of the concept of reasonable 
accommodation in leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions, and 
demonstrate how accommodation of workers with religious beliefs 
remained central to the development of the jurisprudence and helped 
make decision-makers more comfortable in adopting a broader theory 
of equality.20 I contrast this in Part II with American jurisprudence on 
the duty to accommodate workers with religious beliefs, which has 
been plagued by concerns that the mandatory nature of reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace may infringe the Establishment 
Clause.21 I conclude in Part III with some brief reflections on the 
implications of the argument. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (challenging the distinction 
between antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates). But see Stewart J. Schwab & 
Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1197 (2003) (arguing that reasonable accommodation must be regarded as distinct from 
Title VII antidiscrimination). 
 19. See Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 827 (noting critics who regard the ADA as a 
mandated benefits program). I nevertheless remain sympathetic to the perspective that all 
jurisprudence and statutes redistribute and allocate resources in some sense. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 888–90 (1987) (noting the arbitrary 
manner in which a particular right during the Lochner era was characterized as positive or 
negative). I simply reject the specious distinctions between the ADA and other civil rights 
legislation that are so common. 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. THE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE IN CANADIAN LAW 
A. Key Background Factors 
Perhaps one of the central ironies of this Article is that Canadian 
human rights law struggled valiantly in the 1970s to adopt insights 
from United States courts to challenge what was then a very 
conservative body of precedents regarding discrimination in 
Canada.22 One of these American doctrines was the disparate impact 
theory of discrimination, first articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.23 In Griggs, the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the use of aptitude tests and a 
high school diploma requirement had a disparate impact on African 
American job applicants and therefore violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196424 notwithstanding the employer’s lack of 
discriminatory intent.25 It was not uncommon for provincial human 
rights tribunals in Canada in the 1970s to apply the disparate impact 
theory developed in Griggs in human rights complaints, only to have 
conservative courts later overturn the tribunal’s decision on the 
grounds that a complainant must demonstrate an employer’s intent to 
discriminate.26  
Each Canadian province and territory, as well as the federally 
regulated sector, has human rights tribunals, specialized bodies that 
hear complaints made under the relevant jurisdiction’s human rights 
code. These statutes prohibit discrimination on various grounds and 
entitle an individual to file a complaint with the relevant human 
rights commission which, in most provinces, investigates the 
complaint and attempts to mediate a settlement where appropriate.27 
 
 22. Hunter & Shoben, supra note 8, at 119. 
 23. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 25. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
 26. Hunter & Shoben, supra note 8, at 119.  
 27. John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating 
Employment Arbitration Agreements in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 1007, 1028–29 (2002). However, British Columbia has abolished its human rights 
commission and maintained only a human rights tribunal. Philip Bryden & William Black, 
Mediation as a Tool for Resolving Human Rights Disputes: An Evaluation of the B.C. Human 
Rights Commission’s Early Mediation Project, 37 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 73, 74 (2004). A 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/2
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If the commission cannot settle a meritorious complaint, it may refer 
the complaint to an independent administrative tribunal specializing 
in human rights to adjudicate the complaint. Only in the relatively 
small number of cases where parties seek and are granted judicial 
review do courts become involved in ruling on human rights 
complaints.28  
A fortuitous convergence of factors in the early 1980s allowed a 
robust duty to accommodate to develop in Canadian jurisprudence. 
Canada adopted a new constitution in 1982, including the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.29 The Charter revolutionized the 
Canadian judiciary’s traditionally conservative approach and led to 
the propagation of a number of new constitutional principles relating 
to equality, including the interpretation of human rights legislation as 
having quasi-constitutional status and the acceptance by Canadian 
courts that equality of opportunity does not always entail identical 
treatment.30 Indeed, the Charter was the first constitutional document 
explicitly to enshrine equality for people with disabilities31 after 
grassroots mobilization by disability rights activists remedied its 
deliberate exclusion from an earlier draft of the Charter.32  
Moreover, the enumeration of “disability” as a ground for 
discrimination in a newly drafted constitution pre-empted arguments 
 
bill that heralds significant changes to Ontario’s human rights system, which would have 
negative effects for individuals alleging discrimination, including the possible imposition of 
user fees in some cases, has been enacted by the Ontario legislature and Royal Assent was 
granted on December 20, 2006. See Human Rights Code, R.S.O., ch. H.19 (1990), amended by 
2006 S.O., ch. 30 (Can.), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Source/Statutes/ 
English/2006/S06030_e.htm. For a critique, see What’s Wrong with Bill 107?, DAWN ONTARIO, 
July 5, 2006, http://dawn.thot.net/aoda-july5-06.html#1. 
 28. Alexandrowicz, supra note 27, at 1029, 1052. Human rights commissions in Canada, 
which enjoy true independence, should not be confused with American employer—controlled 
arbitrations.  
 29. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.). 
 30. Lynk, Hardy, supra note 11, at 963. 
 31. Sarah Armstrong, Disability Advocacy in the Charter Era, 2 J.L. & EQUALITY 33, 35 
(2003). However, the equality rights provision in the Charter did not take effect until 1985. Part 
I of the Constitution Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 32(2) (U.K.). 
 32. WILLIAM BOYCE ET AL., A SEAT AT THE TABLE: PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AND 
POLICY MAKING 49–65 (2001); David Lepofsky, The Long, Arduous Road to a Barrier—Free 
Ontario for People with Disabilities: The History of the Ontarians with Disabilities Act—The 
First Chapter, 15 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 144–46 (2004).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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for developing different levels of scrutiny for the various grounds of 
discrimination, which would have amounted to a hierarchy of 
rights.33 While the Charter only applies in cases involving state 
action,34 human rights legislation typically covers all services 
customarily available to the general public.35 Ontario, Canada’s most 
populous province, also prohibited disability discrimination in its 
human rights code in 1982, although again only after a concerted 
lobbying effort by disability rights activists.36  
In the Charter era, labor arbitrators have acquired the ability to 
apply human rights jurisprudence, enabling unionized workers to 
obtain remedies against all prohibited grounds of discrimination 
(including disability discrimination) in the expedited and efficient 
forum of arbitration. Accordingly, arbitrators’ decisions frequently 
reflect an intricate understanding of human rights and 
discrimination.37 Given the comparatively high union density rate in 
Canada38 this is no small victory.  
The first Supreme Court of Canada decision to analyze 
comprehensively the issue of accommodation in the workplace in the 
context of religion was Ontario Human Rights Commission v. 
Simpsons-Sears, Ltd. (O’Malley),39 a decision that was released in 
1985, three years after the enactment of the charter. In this case 
disability rights activists were fully aware of the confluence of issues 
and both the Canadian Association of the Mentally Retarded and the 
cross-disability advocacy organization, the Coalition of Provincial 
 
 33. This dramatically contrasts with the American constitutional experience, which has 
reviewed alleged discrimination on the basis of disability using the deferential “rational basis” 
test, rather than the stricter scrutiny applied in race discrimination cases. See, e.g., City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 34. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, 
§ 32 (U.K.). For a recent discussion by the Supreme Court of Canada, see R. v. Advance 
Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.R. 209, 307 (Can.). 
 35. See, e.g., Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H 6, § 5 (1985). 
 36. Kaye Joachim, Seniority Rights and the Duty to Accommodate, 24 QUEEN’S L.J. 131, 
134 (1998). Ontario’s prohibition of disability discrimination occurred only after a concerted 
lobbying effort by disability rights activists. See Lepofksy, supra note 32, at 140–44. 
 37. Lynk, Disability, supra note 11, at 51–52. 
 38. Morley Gunderson, Ten Ingredients of Labour Policy for the New World of Work, 28 
CANADIAN PUB. POL’Y 117, 119 (2002). 
 39. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Simpsons-Sears, Ltd. (O’Malley), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 
(Can.).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/2
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Organizations of the Handicapped (now known as the Council of 
Canadians with Disabilities), successfully obtained intervener status 
and thus were allowed to make submissions to the Supreme Court in 
O’Malley.40 
B. O’Malley 
In O’Malley, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously ruled 
that a major retailer discriminated against a retail clerk belonging to 
the Seventh Day Adventist Church on the basis of her creed because 
it would not accommodate her principled refusal to work during the 
Sabbath (Friday nights and Saturdays) which occurred during the 
retailer’s busiest sales periods.41 The Court overruled the human 
rights tribunal and all appellate courts which had all originally found 
in favor of the retailer.42 The Court held that the employer’s actions 
violated the provision of the Ontario Human Rights Code that 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of creed.43 There is no 
equivalent to the American Establishment Clause44 in Canadian 
constitutional law. In fact, provincial funding for specified religious 
minorities to build parochial schools is constitutionally entrenched 
under the terms of the Constitution Act of 1867, Canada’s founding 
constitutional document.45 Therefore, the Supreme Court was not 
constitutionally limited concerning any improper establishment of 
religion and, absent the constitutional shackles of an Establishment 
Clause, was free to address the substantive issues in the case.  
How did the Supreme Court of Canada reach a conclusion so at 
odds with the legal reasoning of the courts and human rights tribunal 
below it? The Court ruled, in an opinion by Justice McIntyre, that 
 
 40. Id. at 545. 
 41. Id. at 560. 
 42. Id. at 542–45. 
 43. Id. at 545. 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3, § 93 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C No. 5 
(Appendix 1985); Grant Huscroft, Canadian and New Zealand Perspectives on the Separation 
of Church and State, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 507, 508–12 (2003). The arbitrary character of this 
framework can be seen by the fact that only Protestants in Roman Catholic-majority provinces 
and Roman Catholics in Protestant-majority provinces were entitled to such rights. Contra 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (ruling that state funding of teachers in religious 
schools violated the Establishment Clause).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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intent is not a required element to establish a claim of discrimination 
on the basis of creed or religion. The Court reasoned that, in many 
cases, establishing proof of employer intent would be an 
insurmountable problem for employees claiming discrimination and 
that identical treatment could result in inequality.46 This decision was 
supplemented by a subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision 
where the Court, considering whether a requirement that members of 
the British Columbia bar be Canadian citizens was discriminatory, 
observed that identical treatment frequently led to serious 
inequality.47 O’Malley therefore articulated the notion of adverse 
effect discrimination where a rule that is not discriminatory on its 
face still effectively has a disproportionate or disparate impact on a 
particular group protected under human rights legislation.48 While a 
rule prohibiting, for example, Latinos from employment in a 
workplace would clearly constitute direct discrimination, a minimum 
height standard for police officers that happened to have a 
disproportionately negative impact on female applicants (who are 
shorter than men on average) would be classified as adverse effect 
discrimination.49 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly 
relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs and 
referred as well to the 1972 congressional amendment to the Civil 
Rights Act that established that the duty to accommodate prohibited 
discrimination based on religious observance and practice.50  
Moreover, the Court asserted a liberal construction of human 
rights legislation, undoubtedly influenced by the recent adoption of 
the 1982 Charter of Rights.51 Finally, the Court allayed employers’ 
concerns that adopting this right would lead to judicial chaos by 
creatively adapting language from the Ontario Human Rights Code 
that provided a defense for defendants accused of discrimination. The 
defense stipulates that once a complainant has set out prima facie 
evidence of adverse effect discrimination, the employer may show 
 
 46. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Simpsons-Sears, Ltd. (O’Malley), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
536, 549 (Can.). 
 47. Law Soc’y of B.C. v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 164 (Can.). 
 48. O’Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 551.  
 49. Id. at 551–52. 
 50. See infra Part II. 
 51. O’Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 546–47. 
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that the workplace rule constitutes a bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) that could not be altered without experiencing 
undue hardship.52 In this case, the Court found that the employer, 
which had presented no such evidence, had not demonstrated that its 
workplace rule constituted a BFOQ and, therefore, to alter the rule 
would cause undue hardship.53 As such, the Court found for the 
plaintiff.54 
C. Bhinder 
In making the argument that religious cases played an important 
role in fostering Canadian legal doctrine I am not implying that there 
was a linear development of the law in favor of a broad and 
substantive duty to accommodate either workers with religious 
beliefs or with disabilities. Setbacks certainly occurred. In Bhinder v. 
Canadian National Railway Co.,55 a contemporaneous decision to 
O’Malley, a Sikh electrician alleged that a new work rule requiring 
him to wear a hard hat at work violated his rights under the Canadian 
Human Rights Act56 because his religion prohibits the removal of his 
turban.57 The Supreme Court upheld a decision of the federal court of 
appeal that had set aside a decision of the human rights tribunal, 
finding that the employer had discriminated against Bhinder on the 
basis of religion.58  
In an opinion also written by Justice McIntyre, the majority 
concluded that once a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) 
has been found to exist, there is no legal duty for the employer to 
accommodate.59 In order to qualify as a BFOR, a workplace rule 
must meet both an objective and a subjective test.60 The rule must 
 
 52. Id. at 552, 555. The terms bona fide occupational qualification and bona fide 
occupational requirement (BFOR) are used interchangeably by Canadian courts and therefore I 
will do so as well. 
 53. Id. at 559–60. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Bhinder v. Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 (Can.).  
 56. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H 6 (1985).  
 57. Bhinder, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 566. This complaint was made under the federal Canadian 
Human Rights Act because railways are one of the few federally regulated industries. 
 58. Id. at 589. 
 59. Id. at 589–90. 
 60. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] S.C.R. 202, 208 (Can.).  
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relate to the performance of the work at hand and be reasonably 
necessary to ensure the efficient and economical performance of the 
job, without endangering the employee, fellow workers, or the 
general public.61 The rule must also be applied honestly, in good 
faith, and with a sincere belief that it is in the interest of reasonably 
efficient work performance with safety considerations in mind.62 
There must be no indication that the rule is adopted to circumvent the 
purpose of human rights legislation.63 The Court held that the 
employer’s hard hat rule, designed to improve safety in the 
workplace, qualified as a BFOR.64 
On the one hand, this ruling continued to apply the Griggs 
disparate impact framework, known as adverse effect discrimination 
in Canadian law.65 However, the Court reasoned that because of 
differences in the statutory language between the Ontario and federal 
human rights legislation there cannot be a duty to accommodate if the 
workplace rule in question constitutes a BFOR.66 At no point did the 
Court analyze any negative implications of establishing rights related 
to religion because such an approach is outside the Canadian 
paradigm of constitutional interpretation.  
D. Central Alberta Dairy Pool 
As legal commentators have noted, O’Malley was silent on the 
critical question of what actually constitutes undue hardship.67 This 
was largely because the employer in that case had not made any 
arguments addressing the issue.68 In Alberta Human Rights 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Bhinder v. Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, 587–88 (Can.). 
 65. Id. at 589. 
 66. Id. at 589–90. In fact, Bhinder was the leading precedent in most Canadian 
jurisdictions because most relevant legislation contained BFOR defenses. See Alvin J. Esau, 
“Islands of Exclusivity”: Religious Organizations and Employment Discrimination, 33 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 719, 780 (2000).  
 67. Katherine Swinton, Accommodating Equality in the Unionized Workplace, 33 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 703, 713 (1995). 
 68. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Simpsons-Sears, Ltd. (O’Malley), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
536, 559–60 (Can.). 
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Commission v. Central Alberta Dairy Pool,69 another Supreme Court 
of Canada decision dealing with workplace accommodations in the 
religious context, the Court elaborated on the principles set out in 
O’Malley and rectified the confusion wrought by Bhinder. In Dairy 
Pool, the Court allowed an appeal from lower court decisions that 
had overturned the decision of a human rights board of inquiry ruling 
that the complainant had been discriminated against in violation of 
Alberta’s human rights statute.70 The Court restored the board of 
inquiry’s decision that the employer had violated the employee’s 
human rights by failing to accommodate his requests for time off 
during days of religious significance.71  
The complainant in Dairy Pool worked at a milk processing 
plant.72 After converting to a religious denomination that observed a 
Saturday Sabbath, the complainant requested his Sabbath as a holiday 
and his employer agreed.73 He also requested two days around Easter 
as a holiday, including the Monday following Easter, and offered to 
work extra days to make up the lost time.74 The employer granted 
him one of these days but maintained that Mondays were particularly 
busy days at the plant.75 The employer warned the complainant that a 
failure to report on the Monday following Easter would result in his 
dismissal.76 When the complainant failed to show up, he was 
immediately terminated.77 Although he was successful with his 
human rights complaint before a board of inquiry, appellate courts 
overruled its decision on the grounds that, under Bhinder, there was 
no duty to accommodate because the employer’s work schedule 
constituted a BFOR.78  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in an opinion by 
Justice Wilson, held that the application of Bhinder was illogical 
because it was unclear that the failure to use a hard hat actually posed 
 
 69. Alta. Human Rights Comm’n v. Cent. Alta. Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 (Can.). 
 70. Id.  
 71.  Id. at 521. 
 72. Id. at 494. 
 73. Id. at 494–95. 
 74. Id. at 495. 
  75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 495–99. 
 77. Id. at 496. 
 78. Id. at 500. 
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a genuine safety risk, and because the whole point of establishing the 
category of adverse effect discrimination was to permit 
accommodation.79 Therefore, a rigid rule prohibiting accommodation 
when the challenged workplace regulation constitutes a BFOR was 
counterproductive and illogical. Accordingly, the Court partially 
overruled Bhinder,80 holding that the employer had a duty to 
accommodate the complainant.81 The facts presented a clear instance 
of adverse effect discrimination, and the employer had not suffered 
undue hardship in attempting to accommodate the complainant.82 
Again, the religious nature of the complainant’s request was relevant 
only in the sense that discrimination on the basis of religion was a 
prohibited ground under the province’s human rights legislation.83 
How far does this duty to accommodate extend? The Court 
articulated six factors to consider when evaluating whether a 
requested accommodation constitutes undue hardship.84 These 
factors, which have become a touchstone for subsequent legal 
analysis in disability discrimination cases, are (i) financial cost, (ii) 
impact on a collective bargaining agreement, (iii) problems of 
employee morale, (iv) interchangeability of the workforce and 
facilities, (v) size of the employer’s operations, and (vi) safety.85 The 
relative weight accorded to each factor varies depending on the facts 
of a particular case.86 
E. Refining the Disability Rights Jurisprudence 
Disability rights jurisprudence has applied the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Dairy Pool in the context of providing 
reasonable accommodations to workers with disabilities in 
increasingly complex and sophisticated ways.87 Indeed, an arbitration 
 
 79. Id. at 512–13. 
 80. Id. at 516–17. 
 81. Id. at 520–21. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Individual’s Rights Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. I 2, § 7(1) (1980). 
 84. Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 520–21. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Lynk, Disability, supra note 11, at 64–65. 
 87. See, e.g., Marilyn Ginsburg & Catherine Bickley, Accommodating the Disabled: 
Emerging Issues Under Human Rights Legislation, 1 CANADIAN LAB. L.J. 72 (1992). 
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board held that a nurse with back injuries ought to be accommodated 
even though the employer insisted that she could not perform any of 
the available nursing jobs.88 The arbitration board held that the 
employer was required to examine how, without suffering undue 
hardship, it could modify or rebundle any of the existing nursing jobs 
so that the disabled nurse could return to work.89 An arbitration panel 
employed a similarly broad interpretation of disability rights, holding 
that a worker who experienced epileptic seizures while working at his 
job as a quality control tester in a Coca-Cola bottling plant had to be 
reinstated and accommodated.90 The arbitrator held that, although 
there was some risk of serious injury to the plaintiff, he was entitled 
to decide whether to assume the risk of working in the plant.91 
These illustrations are not intended to present a comprehensive 
portrait of the duty to accommodate workers with disabilities in 
Canadian law. Rather, they confirm how, once established, the 
existing body of law relating to accommodating religious minorities 
was effectively and creatively adapted by advocates for workers with 
disabilities to secure vital accommodations. Having the luxury of 
judicial officials, human rights adjudicators, and arbitrators 
accustomed to the expansive notion of accommodation and equality 
established in the law of religious minorities, it was relatively easy to 
make the discursive leap to disability discrimination. Nevertheless, 
some issues, such as the confusing and ambiguous distinction 
between adverse effect and direct discrimination, remained. For 
instance, a workplace rule imposing a mandatory pregnancy test 
could be characterized as either direct discrimination against women 
or a neutral rule affecting all workers which has an adverse effect on 
women. Given that the duty to accommodate may or may not apply 
 
 88. Calgary Dist. Hosp. Group & United Nurses of Alta., [1994] 41 L.A.C. 319, 326–27 
(Can.). 
 89. Id.; see also Lynk, Disability, supra note 11, at 70–71.  
 90. T.C.C. Bottling Ltd. & R.W.D.S.U., [1993] 32 L.A.C. 73, 91–94 (Can.). 
 91. Id.; see also Lynk, Disability, supra note 11, at 72 (discussing the significance of the 
T.C.C. Bottling arbitration case). Contra Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2003) 
(holding that an employer was entitled under the ADA to reject an applicant with liver disease 
on the grounds that his health posed a direct threat to the applicant). 
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depending on how this arbitrary and unstable distinction is resolved, 
this issue caused many observers considerable consternation.92 
The expansive interpretation of disability accommodations 
reached its climax in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
British Columbia Public Service Employee Relations Commission v. 
B.C.G.S.E.U. (Meiorin).93 In this case, the Court restored an 
arbitrator’s decision that an aerobic fitness standard for firefighters 
constituted adverse effect sex discrimination because it 
disproportionately affected female firefighters.94 The case is rightly 
regarded as a landmark decision because it developed a new test that 
eliminated the often difficult and arbitrary distinction between 
adverse effect and direct discrimination.95 Under the Meiorin test, a 
decision-maker must make three inquiries: (i) whether the employer 
adopted the challenged standard for a purpose rationally connected to 
the performance of the job; (ii) whether the employer chose the 
standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was required to 
fulfill the work related purpose; and (iii) whether the standard is 
reasonably necessary in that it would be impossible to accommodate 
an individual employee without imposing undue hardship upon the 
employer.96 The employer must pass all three parts of the test in order 
to demonstrate undue hardship.97  
There is a remarkable shift in the ruling from the idea of 
accommodation as an exception to a sensible norm made for specific 
atypical individuals to challenging the legitimacy of the entire rule or 
standard in a given workplace in order to include religious minorities 
and people with disabilities as a welcome part of the community on 
an equal basis.98 This is illustrated by the Court’s thoughtful 
discussion of methods of challenging systemic discrimination99 and 
 
 92. Sheppard, supra note 9, at 538–39 (analyzing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Meiorin). 
 93. B.C. Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Comm’n v. B.C.G.S.E.U. (Meiorin), [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
 94. Id. at 44–45. 
 95. Sheppard, supra note 9, at 538–39. 
 96. Meiorin, [1999] 3 S.C.R. at 32–33. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 25 (“[I]f a standard is classified as being ‘neutral’ at the threshold stage of the 
inquiry, its legitimacy is never questioned.”). 
 99. Id. at 24–27. 
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the Court’s eloquent insistence that employers “must build 
conceptions of equality into workplace standards.”100 Moreover, the 
third branch of the Meiorin test is a demonstrably high standard to 
meet.101  
Supreme Court of Canada decisions since Meiorin have continued 
to promote an innovative substantive concept of equality. In British 
Columbia Superintendent of Motor Vehicles v. British Columbia 
Council of Human Rights,102 the Supreme Court of Canada applied 
Meiorin to a claim that a blanket rule prohibiting people with 
homonymous hemianopia, a visual impairment, from holding driver’s 
licenses violated such a person’s rights under the British Columbia 
Human Rights Code.103 The Court, in allowing the complainant’s 
appeal, held that this prohibition was not reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the goal of highway safety when feasible alternatives, 
such as individualized testing, were readily available.104 Another 
important Supreme Court of Canada decision providing an expansive 
conception of disability discrimination was Quebec Human Rights 
and Youth Rights Commission v. Montreal.105 In this case, the Court 
held that various plaintiff employees with medical conditions which 
caused no functional limitations whatsoever were still entitled to file 
disability discrimination complaints under Quebec’s Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms.106 The Court sensitively articulated a 
broad definition of disability that did not require the presence of 
functional limitations and permitted decision-makers to consider a 
subjective perception of disability.107 While many challenges 
certainly remain and barriers for people with disabilities in Canada 
continue to be profound,108 Canadian courts have demonstrated 
 
 100. Id. at 38. 
 101. See, e.g., Lynn A. Iding, In a Poor State: The Long Road to Human Rights Protection 
on the Basis of Social Condition, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 513, 518 (2003) (arguing that a defendant 
must meet a very high impossibility standard under the third branch of the Meiorin test). 
 102. B.C. Superintendant of Motor Vehicles v. B.C. Council for Human Rights, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 868 (Can.). 
 103. Id. at 869–73. 
 104. Id. at 887–92. 
 105. Que. Comm’n of the Rights of the Person & the Rights of Youth v. Montreal, [2000] 1 
S.C.R. 665 (Can.). 
 106. Id. at 691. 
 107. Id. at 697. 
 108. For an anthology presenting a critical perspective of the state of disability policy in 
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promising signs on the issue of workplace accommodations in an 
otherwise bleak policy environment for advocates of social justice.109  
II. THE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE IN AMERICAN LAW 
A. Origins of the Duty to Accommodate 
The American experience with regard to the issue of 
accommodating religious minorities in the workplace is a dramatic 
contrast. I argue in this section that the jurisprudential stillbirth of 
American religious accommodation law precluded the creative 
applications that were illustrated in the discussion of Canadian 
disability rights law in Part I. I stress that the purpose of this part is 
not to provide a comprehensive treatment of the complex and 
voluminous debates surrounding the scope of the Establishment 
Clause.110 Rather, I seek only to demonstrate that the narrow 
interpretations of the duty to accommodate workers with disabilities 
under the ADA have, in part, to do with the fact that cross-
fertilization with the duty to accommodate workers’ religious beliefs 
was never possible because this jurisprudence has not reached 
fruition.  
Within a few years of the passage of Title VII in 1964,111 the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the 
first guidelines for the prohibition of religious discrimination under 
Title VII.112 The guidelines stated that employers had a duty to 
accommodate religious employees and prospective employees 
without suffering undue hardship.113 These guidelines received an 
initially frosty reception by the courts which, for example, rejected 
 
Canada, see generally CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, 
POLICY, AND LAW (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds., 2006). I have authored a chapter in 
this book. 
 109. See Fiona Sampson, Globalization and the Inequality of Women with Disabilities, 2 
J.L. & EQUALITY 16 (2003) (outlining the negative impact of globalization for Canadian women 
with disabilities). 
 110. For a typical discussion of the scope of the Establishment Clause, see Ira C. Lupu, 
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of 
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000). 
 112. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2004). 
 113. Id. 
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claims by religious employees that they could not work overtime.114 
Congress, at the instigation of West Virginia Senator Jennings 
Randolph, amended Title VII in 1972 to include an explicit duty to 
accommodate in subsection 701(j) and to provide a broad definition 
of “religion” that includes religious observance and practice.115 
Nevertheless, despite the release of new EEOC guidelines in 1980,116 
judicial interpretation of the duty to accommodate has remained 
restrictive as courts struggle with giving effect to both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.117 In one glaring and 
extreme example, a district court held that where a Jehovah’s Witness 
plaintiff claimed that he could not perform required work duties 
involving the raising and lowering of the American flag, inquiry into 
the tenets of a plaintiff’s religion violated the Establishment Clause 
and Title VII was therefore unconstitutional.118 Although the Third 
 
 114. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d per 
curiam, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), stating “Congress did not intend that employers or labor 
organizations should be harassed with respect to claims not involving discrimination.” This 
quotation speaks volumes about the depth of analysis of American courts at the time, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s pre-Title VII decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963), that South Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying the appellant 
unemployment compensation because her faith as a Seventh-Day Adventist prohibited her from 
working on Saturdays. But see Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d 
per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) (ruling that Title VII did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 115. Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent 
Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 575, 583–85 (2000) [hereinafter Kaminer, Failure]; Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family 
Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
305, 333–34 (2004) [hereinafter Kaminer, Work-Family]; Robert A. Caplen, Note, A Struggle of 
Biblical Proportions: The Campaign to Enact the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, 
16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 585 (2005). 
 116. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious 
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 385–87 (1997). 
 117. Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act, 
17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185, 255 (1996). “Although a legislative enactment favoring 
religion over private interests may survive an Establishment Clause challenge, it is evident that 
such a law must be extremely limited to pass constitutional muster.” Id. In this Article, I have 
ignored Title VII cases dealing with the accommodation requirements that a worker pay union 
dues because such payments violate his or her religious beliefs. 
 118. Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622, 632 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 
613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980). The district court in Gavin reasoned that if an individual is able to 
determine his own beliefs, the amendment would create due process problems, which, in 
conjunction with other case law, “might lead to the result that only those with easily 
recognizable, or common, religious beliefs would be protected.” 
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Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this decision119 it still 
illustrates how courts, mindful of the constitutional dictates of the 
Establishment Clause, are reluctant to give broad interpretation to 
Title VII’s duty to accommodate.  
B. Hardison 
The United States Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue of 
religious accommodation in the workplace and the scope of the undue 
hardship defense. In perhaps the most well-known decision on this 
issue, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,120 the Court held that 
there was no violation of the duty to accommodate under Title VII 
when a newly converted member of the Worldwide Church of God 
was dismissed from his employment as a clerk at the airline’s 
maintenance base after he refused to work a shift that conflicted with 
his Saturday Sabbath.121 The employer had successfully 
accommodated the worker in a previous position through a shift 
change, but he transferred to a better job where his seniority, as 
negotiated between the employer and the union was inadequate to 
win him shifts that complied with his religious beliefs.122 The 
employer maintained that it would be unacceptable for the plaintiff to 
work only four days per week because he performed essential work 
that had to be completed.123 Additionally, bringing in an employee 
from another department to cover the shift would under staff another 
crucial operation of the airline and constitute undue hardship.124 
Finally, the employer maintained that it was undue hardship for it to 
hire someone at premium wages who did not normally work on 
Saturdays.125  
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, overturned the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and held that 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 121. Id. at 81. For a detailed discussion, see Corrada, supra note 117, at 195–201. 
 122. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67–68. 
 123. Id. at 68–69.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
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the employer and union did not breach Title VII.126 The majority 
concluded that the EEOC guidelines, the wording of the statute, and 
the legislative history were not useful guides in evaluating the extent 
of the duty to accommodate.127 The Court applied its own analysis, 
concluding that the duty to accommodate does not require an 
employer to take measures inconsistent with a collective bargaining 
agreement, such as disrupting the seniority system.128 Therefore, any 
accommodation cost that is greater than a de minimis expense for the 
employer constitutes undue hardship because it treats employees 
differently on the basis of religious belief.129  
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented.130 He 
argued that even though a requested accommodation involves treating 
religious employees differently, it need not be automatically 
rejected.131 Moreover, although questioning whether the majority’s 
definition of undue hardship under Title VII was too restrictive,132 the 
dissent determined that the cost of accommodations in this case, that 
is the costs of a replacement or of transferring the plaintiff back to his 
original department,133 would have been de minimis.134 
The majority’s decision to construct a narrow duty to 
accommodate is based on an utterly impoverished conception of the 
meaning of equality.135 Interpreting legal doctrine is hardly a science; 
rules are not fixed in stone to be read by courts as if they had some 
pre-determined meaning. As the legal realists so famously 
demonstrated, the interpretation of the scope of any given legal rule is 
inevitably a reflection of the particular facts of a case and the broader 
policy issues at stake.136 A great deal of indeterminacy in the 
 
 126. Id. at 83–85. 
 127. Id. at 74–75. 
 128. Id. at 79. 
 129. Id. at 84–85. 
 130. Id. at 87. 
 131. Id. at 87–88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s interpretation “makes 
a mockery of the statute”). The dissent concluded that, given the facts, it was not necessary to 
resolve the complex First Amendment issues in this case. Id. 
 132. Id. at 92. 
 133. Id. at 95–96. 
 134. Id. at 92. 
 135. See id. at 84–85 (majority opinion) (finding substantively different treatment among 
workers on the basis of religion to be unacceptable). 
 136. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1 Malhotra book pages.doc  4/12/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
application of any given legal principle or precedent is therefore 
unavoidable because they are malleable.137 This however, also means 
that decision-makers must stay within a certain framework to shape 
the contours of the law in accordance with their conception of the 
broader policy issues in play. 
Along these lines, the majority in Hardison was unwilling to 
infringe upon seniority rights that had been established as a result of 
negotiations authorized under and regulated by the Railway Labor 
Act.138 In fact, the Court noted that seniority provisions are always 
included in collective bargaining agreements and described those 
agreements as constituting the core of national labor policy.139 
Although the Court only obliquely referred to the Establishment 
Clause,140 I think that it is fair to assert that it was very clearly a 
factor in formulating the narrow duty to accommodate at every stage 
of its analysis.141 The constant fear that any legal rights given to 
accommodating workers with religious beliefs might illegitimately 
infringe upon the constitutional dictate that Congress not establish 
any religion understandably led the Court to act cautiously in 
delineating the rights of religious workers. Truncated at an early 
moment of life, the possibility for a comprehensive and sophisticated 
duty to accommodate jurisprudence that might have influenced later 
ADA case law on accommodation thus died at birth. 
 
Century’s End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 75 (1999) (“Legal realists seem predisposed to construct 
legal premises by reference to the particular factual circumstances of a case, to in—the—world 
policies and purposes attributed to the authors of textual authority, and to the decision—
makers’ own understanding of the public interest, often as informed by the social sciences.”). 
But see Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 52 (William Edmundson & Martin Golding eds., 2004) (“[The 
legal realist] claim cannot be . . . that any strict or loose construal of precedent is always valid. 
It must only be that lawyers and judges have this interpretive latitude often enough to inject a 
considerable degree of indeterminacy into law.”). 
 137. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 903, 938 (2005) (“The indeterminacy of the law is widely accepted among legal 
scholars.”). 
 138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–167 (2006); see, e.g., Corrada, supra note 117, at 196. 
 139. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). 
 140. Id. at 69–70 n.4. 
 141. See Malloy, supra note 15, at 627–28; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992) 
(“A more burdensome accommodation requirement [in Hardison] would violate the 
Establishment Clause.”).  
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C. Ansonia and Estate of Thornton 
The second United States Supreme Court decision to consider the 
scope of Title VII’s duty to accommodate workers with religious 
beliefs was Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.142 In Ansonia, 
the Court reviewed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversing the district court’s ruling that a schoolteacher failed 
to demonstrate a violation of his civil rights under Title VII when his 
employer prohibited him, in compliance with a collective bargaining 
agreement, from taking paid leave to participate in religious 
observances for more than three days per year.143 The plaintiff was a 
member of the Worldwide Church of God, which required him to 
miss work on approximately six mandatory holy days per year.144 He 
consequently lost pay on these additional days and also had to fund 
the cost of a substitute teacher.145 He proposed a number of solutions 
including using personal leave days for religious observance, 
notwithstanding the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Alternatively, he suggested that he receive full pay for the additional 
days of religious observance.146  
The district court held that the plaintiff had failed to show a 
violation of Title VII because he had not been placed in a position 
where he had to choose between violating the tenets of his religion or 
losing his job.147 A majority of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.148 It held that 
a prima facie case of discrimination is established where: (a) an 
employee’s bona fide religious belief conflicts with an employment 
requirement, (b) the employee has informed the employer of the 
belief, and (c) the employee was disciplined for failing to comply 
with the requirement despite the conflict.149 The Court of Appeals 
ruled that the plaintiff had demonstrated all of these conditions, and 
 
 142. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 143. Id. at 62–66. 
 144. Id. at 62–63. 
 145. Id. at 64–65. The plaintiff attempted other solutions to get around the collective 
bargaining agreement including scheduling medical appointments on holy days. Id. at 64. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 65. 
 148. Id.   
 149. Id. at 65–66. 
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that where there are conflicting ideas about the most appropriate 
accommodation the employee’s requested accommodation ought to 
be selected unless it amounts to undue hardship.150 It remanded the 
case for determination of whether the employee’s proposed 
accommodation actually constituted an undue hardship.151  
The United States Supreme Court majority, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, held that an employer meets its obligations to 
accommodate a religious employee under Title VII wherever it offers 
the employee a reasonable accommodation.152 The employer need not 
demonstrate that the employee’s preferred accommodation 
constitutes undue hardship.153 Therefore, the Court upheld the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, though with a different line of 
reasoning that rejected the substantive duty to accommodate 
suggested in the EEOC guidelines themselves.154 The Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the 
accommodation constituted undue hardship.155 Ansonia is even more 
restrictive than Hardison because, under Ansonia, the employer does 
not even have to consider the accommodation proposed by the 
employee.156 In light of such a restrictive interpretation it is 
unsurprising that the duty to accommodate did not flourish.  
Justice Marshall dissented in Ansonia, arguing for a more 
comprehensive interpretation to the scope of the duty to 
accommodate in concordance with his dissent in Hardison.157 The 
dissent argued that where the employer proposed accommodations do 
not fully resolve the conflict between the worker’s religion and his 
employment obligations, the employer should be bound to consider 
any reasonable proposals made by the employee up to the point of 
undue hardship.158 Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall granted 
 
 150. Id. at 66. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 68. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 69. 
 155. Id. at 70.  
 156. Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination, Accommodation, and Universal 
Mandates—Aren’t They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 127–28 (2003). 
 157. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 73-74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 158. Id. at 72–73; see also Kaminer, Failure, supra note 115, at 595–96 (analyzing 
Marshall’s Ansonia dissent). 
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appropriate weight to the EEOC guidelines, noting that the Court 
itself had recently relied on them.159 Therefore, he would have 
remanded the case for factual findings with respect to both the 
employer’s leave policies and the reasonableness and potential 
hardship of the plaintiff’s proposals.160 Justice Marshall’s proposed 
substantive duty to accommodate might have positively influenced 
the development of ADA jurisprudence if it had been followed by a 
majority of the Court. 
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,161 a majority of the Court, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, held that a Connecticut statute that 
allowed workers the right not to work on the Sabbath and to obtain 
remedies for actions taken by employers in response to such refusals 
was unconstitutional.162 The Court held that by placing the interests 
of Sabbath observers above secular interests, the Connecticut statute 
violated the Establishment Clause.163 This ruling again blocked the 
possibility of developing the notion of accommodation through case 
law, a discursive practice that might have assisted courts in 
understanding the duty to accommodate when it was later mandated 
under the ADA.  
D. Other Courts 
The same inflexible and unimaginative interpretations that guided 
the Hardison, Ansonia, and Estate of Thornton decisions may be seen 
in Title VII duty to accommodate cases that came before lower 
courts. For instance, in United States v. Board of Education for the 
School District of Philadelphia,164 the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that the firing of a Muslim schoolteacher who wore 
Muslim attire to her workplace was justified because it would 
constitute undue hardship under Title VII’s duty to accommodate by 
exposing the school board to liability under a Pennsylvania state law 
requiring public school teachers to refrain from wearing religious 
 
 159. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 73–74. 
 160. Id. at 75. 
 161. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
 162. Id. at 710–11. 
 163. Id. at 709–11. 
 164. United States v. Bd. of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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clothing and insignia.165 The court held that that the goal of creating 
an atmosphere of religious neutrality was legitimate and justified the 
firing of the teacher.166 Because the undue hardship bar was set so 
low, the Title VII duty to accommodate jurisprudence never truly 
flourished, and decisions such as this one, where a teacher’s attire 
hardly constitutes a major employer accommodation and would be 
costless, became enshrined in law.  
In an even more puzzling case, a district court held that the 
employer did not violate its Title VII duty to accommodate when it 
refused to allow a Sikh restaurant manager an exemption from its 
national grooming policy that prohibited beards, a policy that 
conflicted with the manager’s religious beliefs.167 The court 
expressed concern that such an exemption constituted an 
unreasonable preference, even though the beard had unique religious 
significance for the Sikh plaintiff. Indeed, the court went so far as to 
announce that, had it been required to reach the question, it would 
have held that Title VII may not be constitutionally applied to require 
the defendants to accommodate the plaintiff.168 It is hard not to see 
the Establishment Clause lurking in the background here, subverting 
potentially creative solutions that could facilitate a substantive duty 
to accommodate workers with religious beliefs.  
E. Title VII Jurisprudence and the ADA 
Decisions in lower courts regarding the duty to accommodate 
religious employees indicate that many of the problems that would 
later arise in ADA jurisprudence reflect limitations that the Title VII 
duty to accommodate jurisprudence did not resolve.169 For instance, a 
minority of courts have held that an employee’s duty to cooperate 
with the employer in finding a reasonable accommodation extends to 
 
 165. Id.; see also Engle, supra note 116, at 392–93. 
 166. Philadelphia, 911 F.2d at 890. 
 167. EEOC v. Sambo’s, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 168. Id. at 92; see also Engle, supra note 116, at 394. 
 169. For more general arguments that the interpretation of the ADA has been marred by the 
improper use of Title VII jurisprudence, see Samuel A. Marcosson, Of Square Pegs and Round 
Holes: The Supreme Court’s Ongoing “Title VII-ization” of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361 (2004). 
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where an employee may be required to compromise her or his 
religious beliefs.170 Thus, in Chrysler Corp. v. Mann,171 the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in reversing a district court’s ruling 
that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff, held that the 
employee wrongfully refused to compromise his religious beliefs.172 
This is particularly revealing because it betrays an attitude that 
religious beliefs reflect a malleable, conscious choice by the religious 
plaintiff that may be altered on a whim. Religion may be contrasted 
with other characteristics such as race which courts tend to regard as 
immutable.173  
Moreover, the same reasoning which seeks to establish the 
artificial and misconceived dichotomy between status and conduct 
mars much of the dysfunctional ADA jurisprudence on mitigating 
measures. Mitigating measures are appliances, medications, and even 
the body’s own compensating mechanisms.174 In a trilogy of cases 
that have been criticized by many advocates of people with 
disabilities,175 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,176 Murphy v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc.,177 and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,178 the 
United States Supreme Court formulated a complex set of rules 
narrowing the definition of disability for ADA purposes to account 
for the effect of mitigating measures.179 These cases suggest that a 
disabled person who refuses to use recommended mitigating 
measures that ostensibly reduce that person’s impairment must 
demonstrate that the refusal was objectively reasonable in order to 
 
 170. Kaminer, Failure, supra note 115, at 599. 
 171. Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 172. Id. at 1286; see also Johnson v. Halls Merch., Inc., 49 F.E.P. Cases 527 (W.D. Mo. 
1989) (ruling that an employee who prefaced many sentences with references to Jesus may have 
had a duty to compromise her religious beliefs). 
 173. Kaminer, Failure, supra note 115, at 599. Some scholars have suggested the 
distinction between status and conduct has undermined Title VII jurisprudence. See Engle, 
supra note 116, at 353 (“For the most part, then, a line between status and volitional conduct 
separates employer actions that are prohibited by Title VII from those that fall under the 
discretion of the employer, outside of Title VII’s scope.”). 
 174. Mark C. Weber, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Employment: A Non-
Retrospective, 52 ALA. L. REV. 375, 378 (2000). 
 175. See, e.g., Tucker, Supreme, supra note 6. 
 176. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 177. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 178. Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 179. Tucker, Supreme, supra note 6, 370–72. 
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qualify as having a disability.180 The failure of courts to establish 
strong, theoretically grounded, and well-articulated rights for 
religious minorities under Title VII cascaded into the problematic 
ADA jurisprudence.  
Worse, ADA jurisprudence has occasionally relied on case law 
narrowly interpreting Title VII’s duty to accommodate workers with 
religious beliefs, particularly when seniority rights under a binding 
collective bargaining agreement conflict with the ADA’s duty to 
accommodate.181 In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,182 the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the ADA does not 
require disability accommodations that are inconsistent with the 
collective bargaining agreement.183 In Eckles, a yardmaster with 
epilepsy sought an exemption from the collective bargaining 
agreement’s seniority provision in order to work on a shift, at the 
expense of a more senior employee, that better met his disability 
accommodation needs. The union initially agreed to accommodate, 
but ultimately refused.184 The plaintiff sued the employer and the 
union under the ADA.185 Although the ADA’s duty to accommodate 
is based on Title VII’s duty to accommodate workers with religious 
beliefs,186 the Senate and House reports on the ADA make clear that 
the de minimis standard in Hardison was not to apply to the ADA.187 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit inexplicably relied on the narrow 
Title VII duty to accommodate workers with religious beliefs in 
concluding that there was no duty to accommodate the plaintiff’s 
disability because of the rigid rule that reasonable accommodation 
requirements must yield to seniority rights under the parties’ 
 
 180. Id. at 372. 
 181. Malloy, supra note 15, at 630–40 (2001) (discussing Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 
F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Ravi A. Malhotra, The Duty to Accommodate Unionized 
Workers with Disabilities in Canada and the United States: A Counter-Hegemonic Approach, 2 
J.L. & EQUALITY 92, 129–32 (2003); Condon A. McGlothlen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp.: Reconciling the ADA with Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This 
the Correct Approach?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043 (1997). 
 182. Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 183. Id. at 1051 (“[T]he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by 
sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.”). 
 184. Id. at 1044. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Malloy, supra note 15, at 627. 
 187. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048–49. 
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collective bargaining agreement.188 The majority of circuits have 
reached the same conclusions as the Seventh Circuit in Eckles.189 
Clearly, the narrow Title VII duty to accommodate jurisprudence has 
cast a long, dysfunctional shadow on ADA jurisprudence.  
F. Renaud and Barnett: A Pair of Contrasts 
Finally, the profound limitations of Hardison, Ansonia, and their 
progeny are demonstrated by contrasting them with both Canadian 
jurisprudence on the accommodation of a religious employee 
requesting an accommodation inconsistent with the collective 
bargaining agreement and the similar problem of when a duty to 
accommodate under the ADA violates an established seniority 
system. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this question in 
Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud.190 The Court in 
Renaud, overturning a decision of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, held that both an employer and a union discriminated against 
a school custodian who was a Seventh Day Adventist when the 
employer dismissed him from his job after the union blocked its 
attempt to construct a work shift that would have complied with his 
religious obligations but would have also violated the collective 
bargaining agreement at the same time.191 The Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Sopinka, held that both the union and the employer have a 
clear duty to accommodate the employee where the union is a party 
to discrimination.192 A union may discriminate simply through its 
acquiescence to a discriminatory rule in the collective bargaining 
agreement, or by impeding an employer’s attempt to accommodate a 
 
 188. Malloy, supra note 15, 633–34. The Court exercised dubious judgment in relying on 
the Rehabilitation Act, the more restrictive statute that governed disability discrimination prior 
to the enactment of the ADA.  
 189. Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 2001); Davis v. Fla. Power & 
Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 
(1st Cir. 1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. 
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 81–83 (3d Cir. 1997); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 
810 (5th Cir. 1997); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 190. Cent. Okanagan Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (Can.). 
 191. Id. at 970–71. 
 192. Id. at 989–90. 
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member.193 Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected the de minimis 
standard for evaluating undue hardship in Hardison in favor of a 
more substantive duty to accommodate.194 This broad duty to 
accommodate paved the way for the same principles to be applied in 
disability rights cases.  
In contrast, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,195 a United States 
Supreme Court decision concerning the conflict between seniority 
rules and the duty to accommodate workers with disabilities under 
the ADA, the majority, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that 
while accommodation requests that violate seniority rules are 
generally unreasonable, plaintiffs could demonstrate special 
circumstances which warrant a breach of the seniority policies.196 In 
Barnett, an airline cargo handler injured his back and requested a 
transfer to a mailroom position that would better accommodate his 
physical disabilities.197 Although he was transferred, he did not have 
sufficient seniority to prevent more senior employees from bidding 
for his highly coveted mailroom position, and he consequently lost 
his job.198 Remarkably, this was not a negotiated seniority system; it 
was imposed by the employer.199 Yet, the Court was clear that 
accommodations generally could not unreasonably interfere with 
seniority systems.200 Worse, it relied partially on the poorly reasoned 
Seventh Circuit decision in Eckles.201 This narrow view of the scope 
of the ADA has been the typical judicial interpretation of the statute. 
However, this interpretation was not inevitable. An interpretation 
based on a more comprehensive duty to accommodate was possible. 
The judicial failure to develop a duty to accommodate in American 
 
 193. Id. at 990–91. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that the employer is usually in a 
better position to implement accommodations, since it is in charge of the workplace. See id. at 
992. 
 194. Id. at 983 (“[T]here is good reason not to adopt the ‘de minimis’ test in Canada. 
Hardison was argued on the basis of the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and its prohibition against the establishment of religion.”). 
 195. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 196. Id. at 394. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 404. 
 200. Id. at 394 (holding that “the seniority system will prevail in the run of cases”). 
 201. Id. at 403–04. 
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jurisprudence should be seen as partially intertwined with the failure 
of the Title VII religious accommodation duty to flourish.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have attempted to document, through an 
examination of Canadian legal developments, how the truncated 
development of the duty to accommodate workers with religious 
beliefs in America has been one contributing factor to the current 
dysfunctional state of ADA jurisprudence. Ironically, at least one 
court has ruled that the Title VII duty to accommodate is itself 
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s tedious Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence.202 This speaks volumes about the state of 
civil rights law in the United States. It is not certain that initiatives 
such as the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) currently 
before Congress203 (which would broaden the duty to accommodate 
contained in subsection 701(j)204), even if enacted and upheld as 
constitutional,205 would do much at this late date to influence the 
development of an already compromised ADA jurisprudence. 
Moreover, I am far from unaware that many social justice advocates 
would strongly oppose any weakening of the Establishment Clause. 
In the long term, if the Establishment Clause dilemma can be 
overcome, I believe that using the campaign for the WRFA and the 
broadening of religious accommodation to alter judicial 
interpretations of the ADA holds greater potential to educate the 
public about more expansive conceptions of equality than constantly 
battling those who regard legislation such as the ADA as inefficient 
economic interventions.206  
 
 202. Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 921–22 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 203. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 204. Kaminer, Work-Family, supra note 115, at 338; Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, 
Pharmacies Balk on After—Sex Pill and Widen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1. 
 205. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as unconstitutional), superseded by statute, Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803. 
 206. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
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Nevertheless, the WRFA is a stopgap measure. The need to 
convince policy makers to adopt a much broader and richer 
conception of equality is evident. Courts should appreciate that 
equality does not necessarily mean identical treatment in order for 
disabled people and religious minorities to flourish. While Canadian 
jurists should be grateful for the importation of profoundly influential 
American insights into disparate impact analysis during the 
tumultuous 1970s,207 the Canadian conceptions of substantive 
equality developed since those days can teach our American cousins 
much. Even without having adopted federal ADA-type legislation, 
Canadian jurisprudence has managed to make significant strides on 
equality for workers with disabilities. 
 
 207. For a classic account of social protest from below in one major American city in the 
early 1970s, see generally DAN GEORGAKAS & MARVIN SURKIN, DETROIT: I DO MIND DYING 
(2d ed. 1998). 
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